Financial services in Australia are under increasing pressure to harden their cybersecurity posture. In recent months, three significant events have exposed a systemic weakness across the sector: the legal action against FIIG Securities, the coordinated credential stuffing attacks on superannuation funds, and the Australian Signals Directorate's national alert on brute-force attacks. These are not isolated incidents. They are connected by a shared pattern—failure to implement and enforce basic cyber hygiene.
Cybersecurity failures are no longer just technical issues. They are legal liabilities, reputational risks, and breaches of trust.
In March 2025, ASIC launched legal action against FIIG Securities. The allegations? Years of cybersecurity neglect led to a breach of over 385GB of sensitive client data. The data of 18,000 individuals was exposed. The breach was not detected internally. ASIC argues that FIIG failed to meet its obligations under sections 912A(1)(a), (d), and (h) of the Corporations Act—specifically, to act efficiently, manage risk, and maintain adequate systems.
Division 3—Obligations of financial services licensees
912A General obligations
(1) A financial services licensee must:
(a) do all things necessary to ensure that the financial services covered by the licence are provided efficiently, honestly and fairly; and
(aa) have in place adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts of interest that may arise wholly, or partially, in relation to activities undertaken by the licensee or a representative of the licensee in the provision of financial services as part of the financial services business of the licensee or the representative; and
(b) comply with the conditions on the licence; and
(c) comply with the financial services laws; and
(ca) take reasonable steps to ensure that its representatives comply with the financial services laws; and
(cb) if the licensee is the operator of an Australian passport fund, or a person with responsibilities in relation to an Australian passport fund, comply with the law of each host economy for the fund; and
(d) subject to subsection (4)—have available adequate resources (including financial, technological and human resources) to provide the financial services covered by the licence and to carry out supervisory arrangements; and
(e) maintain the competence to provide those financial services; and
(f) ensure that its representatives are adequately trained (including by complying with section 921D), and are competent, to provide those financial services; and
(g) if those financial services are provided to persons as retail clients:
(i) have a dispute resolution system complying with subsection (2); and
(ii) give ASIC the information specified in any instrument under subsection (2A); and
(h) subject to subsection (5)—have adequate risk management systems; and
(j) comply with any other obligations that are prescribed by regulations made for the purposes of this paragraph.
This case marks a line in the sand: regulators will now hold firms accountable for prolonged cybersecurity failures.
Just weeks later, attackers used credential stuffing tactics to target Australian Super, Rest Super, and Australian Retirement Trust. These attacks exploited customers who reused passwords. Pensioners had accounts accessed without authorisation. Financial data was stolen. Trust was eroded. These were not sophisticated exploits—they were preventable.
The takeaway is clear: no financial institution is immune. Even well-funded, well-resourced firms are exposed when basic controls are missing.
The Australian Signals Directorate has warned of an increase in brute-force attacks across the financial sector:
This is not theory. These are the exact failings that allowed FIIG and the super funds to be compromised.
This is not just about loss of data. It is about loss of trust, loss of confidence, and loss of your ability to do business.